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The brunt of my claim in this paper is that the notion expressed in the slogan, 
“incommensurability of values” is misleading at best, pernicious at worst, and that its 
implications for practical rhetoric—which is to say, arguments when they go to work—
are especially unfortunate.  
The case is straightforward. There is nothing in the original mathematical 
metaphor or in the developments in philosophy of science that warrants the use of 
incommensurability as a technical term in ethics. Values are bigger, lumpier things than 
the term incommensurability prototypically references, and the deployment of the word in 
philosophy of science also references markedly different issues than it does in the domain 
of values. Moreover, that domain flat-footedly misappropriates the term for duties it 
doesn’t serve elsewhere, comparison. Worst of all, the implications of the use of 
incommensurability as a technical term are to draw attention away from the value-
holders, who might well reconcile discrepant values if given the chance, and to direct that 
attention generally towards reified values, and specifically towards some putative 
relationship between reified values that precludes reconciliation. 
  
Mathematical roots 
 
Incommensurability of values is, at the root, a mathematical metaphor that 
compares moral and aesthetic ideas to numbers. Incommensurable numbers are paired 
numbers without a common divisor—in the 6th century BCE Pythagorean milieu in which 
the notion was invented, such numbers are “without common measure” [Gk. asummetra 
which morphed to L. incommensurable in the Latin Middle Ages]. Moral ideas include 
such things as liberty and equality; aesthetic ideas, beauty and grandeur.  
 
Philosophy of science roots 
 
Incommensurability, however—the nominalization—came into widespread 
modern usage via philosophy of science in the early 1960s.1 Paul Feyerabend and 
Thomas Kuhn jointly, though not collaboratively, developed a sense that scientific 
theories (frameworks, paradigms, …) can be encapsulated isolates. Feyerabend’s and 
Kuhn’s arguments draw on a constellation of notions inherited from logical empiricism 
(chiefly the concepts of frameworks, meaning variance, and theory-ladenness) and apply 
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them to instances of theory succession in the history of science. The reasoning runs 
something like this: 
 
• Theoretical terms get their meaning from the frameworks they participate in. 
• Meanings change as the framework changes.  
• There are discontinuous jumps in frameworks applying to the same domains.  
• Not everybody in the field makes those jumps.  
• Therefore—subtotal—we sometimes get situations in which two variant 
frameworks in a domain have different meanings for key terms (like planet, in the 
classic Ptolemaic/Copernican example, which included the sun for Ptolemy but 
not Copernicus, included the earth for Copernicus but not Ptolemy).  
• Those variant frameworks cannot be objectively adjudicated because  
o the meanings of the terms are given by different contexts, and 
o there is no external third (fourth, fifth, …) context into which both sets of 
meanings can be rendered 
• Therefore—big conclusion—we get incommensurability between such 
frameworks.  
 
In addition to this logical-empiricist technical machinery, Kuhn (especially) 
brought in themes from gestalt psychology, social psychology, and linguistics—all of 
which were seen to compromise notions of rationality. He talked about the discontinuous 
jumps between frameworks in terms of the belief structure of the adherents to the new 
variant. It was like perceiving one of the potentialities in a gestalt image, then leaping to 
the next. It was like religious conversion. It happened suddenly and totally, and was 
independent of reason. He talked further of the frameworks being like different, non-
intertranslatable languages. Drawing on the thesis of linguistic relativity, he suggested the 
adherents ‘lived in different worlds.’ Needless to say, whatever implications of relativism 
were latent in the lack of neutral contexts for adjudicating between variant frameworks, 
they were made highly salient by Kuhn’s use of these analogies. 
Thus began a cottage industry in philosophy of science, and not just there. 
Sociology of scientific knowledge effectively owes its existence to adumbrations of 
scientific incommensurability. So does rhetoric of science. So does a widespread interest 
in suasive argumentation in the history of science. –All three of these movements realize 
what Richard Rorty has called “The rhetorical turn” (Simons 1990, vii). The extremely 
influential scholarly idiom known as postmodernism, also draws significantly on 
incommensurability; Feyerabend is virtually a founding father of that dialect.  
In short: there is a collection of semantic and thematic pressures beyond the 
straightforward mathematical metaphor bearing on the slogan, “incommensurability of 
values.”  
 
Discourse of values roots 
 
The non-mathematical use of the word incommensurability before Feyerabend 
and Kuhn was restricted and arcane; they brought fresh attention to the concept, creating 
a problem field, and popularizing the nominalization. But the non-mathematical use of 
 2 
R. Harris’ “Rhetoric and the Incommensurability of Values” 
incommensurable dates at least to the seventeenth century.2 Long before the 1960s, that 
is, there was an adjective, a quality that might hold of some pairs of phenomena, but there 
was not yet a noun, a locus of attention.  
What is most interesting about the adjective is that it very often implicates values. 
The second edition of Oxford English Dictionary (OED2) defines what it calls the 
‘general’ use of incommensurable, as “having no common standard of measurement; not 
comparable in respect of magnitude or value,” exemplifying that definition with this 
collection of paradigmatic sentences: 
 
1660 R. Coke Justice Vind. 12 Whether such things so apprehended by the 
Senses, be pleasant, profitable, just or unjust…commensurable, or 
incommensurable. 1664 H. More Myst. Iniq. Apol. 539 Will not this Position 
prove as incommensurable to humane affairs and be laden with as great 
inconveniences? 1796 Burke Let. Noble Ld. Wks. 1842 II. 260 Between money 
and such services…there is no common principle of comparison: they are 
quantities incommensurable. 1845 De Quincey Nat. Temperance Movem. Wks. 
XII. 167 The two states are incommensurable on any plan of direct comparison. 
1881 Westcott & Hort Grk. N.T. II. 46 The rival probabilities represented by 
relative number of attesting documents must be treated as incommensurable. 
Some of the uses of incommensurable catalogued here have technical connotations to 
them, and some are fairly indeterminate from what we can see in these brief snatches. But 
overall these five sentences, sampling from three centuries of use, illustrate a lengthy, if 
not dense or widespread, deployment of incommensurable in the realm of values. The 
usage clearly penetrated moral philosophy, perhaps even originating with it. Roger 
Coke’s (1660) treatise, the earliest OED2 citation, falls into that genre—the full title is 
Justice Vindicated from the False Fucus put upon it by Thos. White Gent., Mr. Thomas 
Hobbs, and Hugo Grotius—though there is no sense from the snippet here (and I haven’t 
examined the original very fully) how systematic or characteristic the connection of 
incommensurable is with values. But by at least the turn of the last century the theme of 
value-(in)commensurability had noteworthy currency in ethics.  
Hastings Rashdall, for instance, in his two-volume Theory of Good and Evil, 
argues that any  
 
two kinds of value are not absolutely incommensurable. However much superior 
the value of a good act may be to that of a transitory pleasure, we still use the 
term 'value' of both, and we use it in the same sense: the two kinds of value differ 
as being at the top and the bottom of the same scale, not as representing two 
totally incommensurable scales. There can be only one ultimate scale of values, 
however heterogeneous the objects which we appraise by that scale (Rashdall 
1907.1 174). 
Rashdall implicitly treats incommensurability as a graduated notion (as the inverse of the 
graduated notion that he elevates, commensurability); what he repudiates is the far end of 
the scale, absolute incommensurability. A cornerstone chapter in the second volume, 
“The commensurability of all values,” epitomizes his “scientific treatment” of ethics. 
Every pleasurable experience for Rashdall (1907.2, 15) is “a sum of other pleasures” 
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(with pleasure construed in a utilitarian or even Socratic sense—knowledge, virtue, and 
so on, are pleasures) which can be calculated via a “hedonistic calculus.” 
Commensurability is not always a concern; it becomes an issue only if we have to choose 
between differently ranked goods, perhaps in differing quantities, “when we cannot have 
both.” In that case, the calculus can be brought in: “we can compare them, and pronounce 
that one possesses more value than the other” (Rashdall 1907.2, 39).  
Rashdall addresses a variety of opponents, hostile to the measurement and/or 
calculation of pleasures (values, goods), but it is not clear there was a distinct position 
that might be connected with the phrase “incommensurability of values”3 until work by 
Sterling Lamprecht on ethical pluralism and prudential values in the early 1920s, which 
flatly contradicts Rashdall:  
 
Many times men are faced with situations in which the potential goods are 
woefully incompatible, in which the choice of one good involves the 
abandonment of another; and sometimes men are faced with still more trying 
situations in which the potential goods are unknown and can not be brought to 
light except on the basis of a daring decision, a decision which is frankly a hazard 
and will not be proved true or false until the outcome has made investigation of 
other expedients forever impossible. The goods of life are utterly 
incommensurable. Health, beauty, courtesy, knowledge, friendship, all these 
cannot be measured by a common scale and tabulated in a common calculus 
(Lamprecht 1920, 564). 
The prolonged clash of rival codes and standards of right is so grave an evil that at 
all costs we must seek to limit and prevent its occurrence. But in so doing, we are 
more likely to meet success if we remember that we are not always judging 
between a right and a wrong, but often between to irreconcilable rights, two 
irreconcilable choices of incommensurable goods (Lamprecht 1920, 570). 
Lamprecht was writing of course, in the wake of the War to End all Wars, and at the very 
outset of—in the title of a prescient book on the middle east—the Peace to End all Peace 
(Fromkin 1989). So, his use of phrases like “prolonged clash of rival codes” and “so 
grave an evil” is not the traffic of abstraction.  
Lamprecht is especially concerned with using value incommensurability to 
counter ethical monism, not just of Rashdall’s utilitarian sort, but any universal-solvent 
project to ethical issues, and to promote its converse, pluralism. Arguing that there are no 
available “eternal principles” by which to measure potential actions that we find valuable, 
Lamprecht endorses an approach in which we make largely personal choices and do not 
require others to act according to our constellation of values. 
I have not explored Lamprecht’s milieu very far at all, but he begins his essay 
with “The general tendency in American philosophy during the last two decades has been 
towards pluralism” (Lamprecht 1920, 561; see also Lamprecht 1921), evoking such 
philosophers such as William James and John Dewey, though the theme of value 
incommensurability does not appear to be prevalent in their work. But some years later 
we find Henry W. Stuart, a student of Dewey’s, putting an overlay of incommensurability 
terminology on Dewey’s views. Summing up the moral he draws from a series of 
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situations that lead to choice among values, a process Dewey explored under the term 
valuation,4 Stuart writes: 
 
The ends in an ethical situation are, then, variously described in [Dewey’s work] 
as incompatible, discrepant, heterogeneous, opposed. They get in each other's 
way; they cannot readily be measured and chosen, one as against the others, 
because no common denominator can be found in terms of which to express their 
relative worth. In ethical situations, that is to say, the rival ends toward which the 
individual finds himself attracted are found to be incommensurable (Stuart 1939, 
298). 
Where Lamprecht clearly uses a general sense of incommensurable, Stuart makes 
the mathematical linkage explicit, and he not only uses the nominalised variant, he uses it 
in a way that suggests he is circumscribing a problem field—“ethical 
incommensurability” (Stuart 1939, 301, 311). For him, incommensurable and 
incommensurability are technical terms.  
It is not clear what contact, if any, Lamprecht and Stuart had with each other. 
They surely knew each other on some level; both were active professional philosophers 
in an overlapping period, at established U.S. schools, at a time when the philosophical 
community was not large.5 Nor is it clear how common was talk about value 
incommensurability among the American pluralists; there are no adequate corpora 
available for electronic searches, and I do not know this literature well. Nor can I say 
what direct influence pragmatists generally, Lamprecht or Stuart specifically, and/or such 
talk might have had on subsequent ethical philosophy. There is no citation presence of 
this work to speak of in the literature of contemporary value incommensurabilists, and, in 
particular, the most substantial figure associated with this line of thought later in the 
century, Sir Isaiah Berlin, does not cite earlier pluralists, aside from occasional notice of 
William James; indeed, in the article “My intellectual path” Berlin says rather 
disarmingly, of the incommensurability of values, “I do not know who else may have 
thought this” (1998, 60).6 Finally, it is not clear what influence, if any, Feyerabend and/or 
Kuhn may have had on Berlin (whose earliest major statement of pluralism, sans 
incommensurability, comes in 1958, with “Two concepts of liberty”).  
That’s a good deal of murk; my apologies. But two things are clear: the fortunes 
of discourse on incommensurability of values were improved substantially by Berlin’s 
work, especially his Four essays on liberty (1969), from which some commentators date 
the movement;7 and the charisma of the word incommensurability was raised 
immeasurably by the work of Feyerabend, and especially Kuhn.8 Berlin’s Four essays, 
the very widely sold second edition of Kuhn’s Structure, and a highly influential group of 
essays on Kuhn’s work, Criticism and the growth of knowledge (Lakatos and Musgrage 
1970), all came out very close to one another, and all made a great many philosophy 
reading lists in the 1970s.  
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Incommensurability of values 
 
The incommensurability-of-values literature over the last quarter of the last 
century, that is, and on into this one, manifests the convergence of two currents of 
philosophical usage, the one Berlin represents, and the Feyerabend-and-Kuhn 
incommensurability-of-scientific-programmes usage, though the latter is distinctly less 
important for the topics and instruments of values literature. Value incommensurabilists 
almost never mention Feyerabend, and mention Kuhn largely to exorcize his massive 
ghost. Ruth Chang’s collection of essays, for instance, Incommensurability, 
Incomparability, and Practical Reason introduces Kuhn on the very first page solely to 
banish (a confused-but-popular version of) him:  
 
We can reject one notion straight off as inapplicable for [incommensurability of 
values discourse]. This is the idea, spawned by the writings of Thomas Kuhn, that 
evaluation across different conceptual schemata, ways of life, or cultures is 
impossible (Chang 1997, 1).  
 
The authors in Chang’s book observe her banishment, with the lone exception of James 
Griffin, who invokes Kuhn in kind—as responsible for an “extreme position,” one that is 
“implausibly strong” (Griffin 1997, 39).9  
What value incommensurabilists mean by the term is, like science-studies 
incommensurabilists, various, but it trucks much more explicitly with comparison—
moral, political, and aesthetic. In the science-studies literature, the relation between 
comparison and incommensurability is controversial. Feyerabend, Kuhn, and their more 
sympathetic expositors deny that incommensurability forecloses theory comparison;10 
many of their opponents insist that it does foreclose comparison (and, further, that since it 
does, it must be wrong, because theories are compared all the time). Often comparability 
is either absent altogether from science studies discussions, or simmers quietly on the 
back burner, present only through allusion. For value incommensurabilists, there is 
almost no controversy (but, like all bodies of scholarly discourse, the almost is necessary 
for every adjective): “What nearly all of us … mean by the ‘incommensurability’ of 
values,” James Griffin volunteers for this discourse community, “is their 
‘incomparability’—that there are values that cannot be got on any scale, that they cannot 
even be compared as to ‘greater’, ‘less’, or ‘equal’” (Griffin 1997, 35). This 
incomparability is sometimes linked to value systems of a sort that correspond to 
frameworks in science studies, as in Berlin’s juxtaposition of Classical and Christian 
values: 
 
[The Greek and Roman heroic system was based on the virtues] of courage, vigor, 
fortitude in adversity, public achievement, order, discipline, happiness, strength, 
justice, above all assertion of one's proper claims and the knowledge and power 
needed to secure their satisfaction [which contrasts with the Christian virtues of] 
charity, mercy, sacrifice, love of God, forgiveness of enemies, contempt for the 
goods of this world, faith in the life hereafter, belief in the salvation of the 
individual soul as being of incomparable value -- higher than, indeed, wholly 
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incommensurable with, any social or political or other terrestrial goal (Berlin, 
1979, 45). 
This wholesale way-of-living contrast looks very much like the framework 
incommensurability that occupies much of Structure, and it clearly echoes Sterling 
Lamprecht’s concern for the “rival codes and standards of right.” It is not, however, a 
subject much treated in the value-incommensurabilist literature (though it will no doubt 
escalate as religious and economic frameworks clash politically in the wake of the 
terrorism and warfare that has defined the early years of the twenty-first century).  
Far more often value incommensurabilists concern themselves with intramural 
clashes, when incommensurability makes choosing among system-internal values 
recalcitrant.11 The claim is not that all values are incommensurable. The choice between a 
cheeseburger, even a really good cheeseburger, and world peace, is not one that many 
people would have trouble making. Further, there are some values that may well be 
incommensurable but are not worth worrying about—choosing between a cheeseburger 
and a re-run of F-Troop on TV—the sorts of things we have whims for. But there are 
some values—“ultimate values,” Berlin calls them, “sacred values” in another theorist’s 
terms (Lukes 1997)—values that are very much worth worrying about, and some of them 
(runs the defining claim of this viewpoint) cannot be commensurated in any rational, 
clear-cut way.  
These sacred values are the familiar, compellingly large abstract notions that have 
preoccupied moral and political philosophy from the days when it was all anima and 
gods. Berlin argues that some of them are, in consummate form, antithetical:   
 
Liberty … is an eternal human ideal, whether individual or social. So is equality. 
But perfect liberty (as it must be in the perfect world) is not compatible with 
perfect equality. If man is free to do anything he chooses, then the strong will 
crush the weak, the wolves will eat the sheep, and this puts an end to equality. If 
perfect equality is to be attained, then men must be prevented from outdistancing 
each other, whether in material or intellectual or spiritual achievement, otherwise 
inequalities will result. ... Similarly, a world of perfect justice—and who can deny 
that this is one of the noblest of human values?—is not compatible with perfect 
mercy. I need not labor the point: either the law takes its toll, or men forgive, but 
the two values cannot both be realized (Berlin 1998, 60). 
While the notions of comparability and ranking drive much of the value-
incommensurability literature (especially a concern for the two relations, better-than and 
equal-to, which are said not to hold in cases of incommensurability), they are not 
compelling interests of that movement’s most immediate sponsor, Berlin. There is no 
overt concern for the lack of a common measure in Berlin, no express worry about 
comparing liberty and equality, justice and mercy.  
What concerns Berlin is not measurement but cancellation. The values push in 
opposite directions, and since they are inverse, more of one means less of the other. 
Berlin customarily plays ultimate values to the full. So the issue is not really that ‘the two 
values cannot be both realized’ (even though Berlin puts it that baldly in excerpt 
above)—one might easily have a half-measure of justice and a half-measure of mercy, for 
instance—but that they cannot both be fully realized at the same moment. Consummate 
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liberty, on Berlin’s story, can only be got by eliminating equality as a value, which by its 
very nature reduces liberty; consummate equality, by eliminating liberty.12 Moreover, life 
will sometimes throw us—personally, but especially politically—into situations where 
there is no option but to choose between conflicting ultimate values, which means 
inevitable tragic loss. We are required by circumstances to choose between sacred and 
mutually exclusive values: one of them has to give. There’s no way out. What to do? 
 
Pluralism + incommensurability 
 
The solution for Berlin, and for many value-incommensurabilists (though, like all  
scholarly literatures, this one is far from homogeneous), is liberalism, which can only be 
got via value-pluralism + incommensurability. What is relevant is not “the mere plurality 
of values,” James Griffin argues. One might have values galore, with varying allegiances 
to all of them (as Rashdall’s lexical essentialism implies, we wouldn’t call them ‘values’ 
if they didn’t have value to us) and still be content (as Rashdall is) with a one-size-fits-all 
calculus; if the values are incommensurable, however, there can be no such calculus. The 
situation calls not for a method, Griffin says, but an attitude, an attitude that brings 
together multiple worth and incommensurability: 
 
a certain important picture of how [values] are related—that they clash, that they 
all matter, that they all have their day, that there are no permanent orderings or 
rankings among them, that life depressingly often ties gain in one value to terrible 
loss in another, that persons may go in very different directions and still lead 
equally valuable lives—call this picture 'liberalism' (Griffin 1986, 91).  
All of these factors—the clashing, the distributed significance, the unavailability of 
absolute rankings, the negation, the inverse relationship of gain and loss, the 
susceptibility to tragedy, and, somewhat perversely, the notion of ‘equally valuable 
life’—follow from the incommensurability fly in the pluralistic ointment, and collectively 
they constitute the ground for liberalism. The enemy of Berlin’s liberalism—as it is with 
William James, Sterling Lamprecht, John Dewey, Henry W. Stuart, and the whole 
plurality of American pluralists—is monism.13 For James, monism is a philosophical 
disease, pluralism the cure. For value-incommensurabilitists, monism is a political 
disease, liberalism the cure. The cure cannot be a methodological one, which would be 
another monism. It must be a stance towards values, and especially towards other value-
holders, that counsels tolerance and respect. The catch, of course, is the same with all 
ethical solutions to moral and political dilemmas—the stance must be shared, indeed, 
universal (which, of course, begins to sound monistic). Everyone needs to realize that 
values are incommensurable so that they don’t attack or coerce other value-holders, or 
follow some other hegemonic programme for their own slate of values.  
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Rhetoric and pluralism 
 
Value pluralism has tremendous appeal for rhetoricians, of course, especially 
rhetoricians of a sophistic stripe. The history of rhetorical theory, aside from brief 
exceptions—the sophists, the Italian humanists, Giambattista Vico—is a handmaid’s tale. 
Truth and value are obtained elsewhere, through other resources, and then rhetoric is 
brought in to market that truth or distribute (or enforce) those values. We can thank Plato 
for the earliest articulation of this position, in the one dialogue in which he lets his foot 
off the throat of rhetoric long enough to allow it a mildly wholesome role in the life of 
men. Having secured the truth, Socrates tells little Phaedrus, “The dialectician selects a 
soul of the right type, and in it he plants and sows his words founded on knowledge” 
(Phaedrus 277a). If truth and value, however, are not universal, immutable Forms, if they 
are contingent products arising from the exchange of argument, if they emerge from 
reciprocal suasion, then rhetoric has a constitutive role, not an auxiliary role, in human 
affairs. And if, as Aristotle argued, rhetoric is allied inextricably with ethics (Rhetoric 
1356a, 1359b), there is also duty associated with this constitutive role.  
The dangers of pluralism (alienation, tribalism, persecution) are at least as great as 
the dangers of monism (zealotry, totalitarianism, persecution), and a constitutive rhetoric 
is the strongest weapon to combat them. Carolyn R. Miller, for instance, has argued for 
“a rhetoric of pluralism” that (in keeping with Aristotle) addresses itself to community 
values over an exaggerated sense of the individual, since hypertrophied individualism 
encourages "anomie and disaffection and ultimately the conviction that reasoned 
argument is not possible because each individual is entitled to his or her conception of the 
good incommensurable by definition with everybody else's" (Miller 1993, 87). She 
advocates a rhetoric addressed “not only to the diversity within any community but also 
to the diversity of communities that co-exist and overlap each other" (Miller 1993, 91).  
 
Incommensurability failures 
 
I’m with Miller all the way, and with Berlin and the pluralists most of the way. 
But there are failures and confusions that confound the use of incommensurability in 
value talk, and my argument is, simply, that it shouldn’t be used—not just because it’s 
misguided and erroneous (it is), but because, as Miller alludes, it has potentially vile 
implications.  
The failures are the failures of analogy. The root metaphor in particular goes 
beyond worthless to malignant. But the explanatory failure of incommensurability in 
philosophy of science is also a parable for value incommensurabilists.  
The numbers 4 and 6 are commensurable because there is a number that divides 
into them both, 2, and can be used to measure them with respect to each other (letting us 
know, for instance, that 4 is 2/3s of 6); π and 6 are not commensurable, they are 
incommensurable, because no sum of πs, nor any proportion of π, can go cleanly into 6, 
and vice versa. Now, we need to ask, what values are commensurable—mercy and 
forgiveness, perhaps? Let’s assume a scheme in which they are both ultimate values.14 
They’re certainly compatible. Mercy (as a rough but I hope sufficient approximation) 
expresses itself as an act that averts some otherwise legitimate but injurious act, usually 
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one that is in some sense ‘deserved.’ Forgiveness is an expression of an internal state that 
relieves or bypasses a state of deserved animosity. One might show mercy without 
forgiveness, and forgive when mercy is not at issue—they aren’t in any entailment 
relation—but they both apply in similar circumstances and might well apply in identical 
circumstances, and they don’t get in each other’s way. Compatibility, sure. But 
commensurability? How? In what conceivable way might they have a ‘common divisor’? 
And if values can’t be commensurable, how can they (or other values) be 
incommensurable?  
Taking it from the other side, justice and mercy—especially retributive justice and 
mercy—conflict. They are called for in similar circumstances, they might be called for in 
identical circumstances, but they don’t go especially well together in the sense that Berlin 
articulates—they pull in opposite directions. They both can’t be completely realized at 
the same time: total mercy might well mean zero justice; total justice, zero mercy. 
Conflicting, sure. But incommensurable? No.  
It’s not so much that there is no common divisor in cases of value-
(in)commensurability. We’re working with a metaphor after all. It’s that there is nothing 
conceivable which corresponds to that element in the metaphor, nothing to fill the 
common-divisor slot of the vehicle. Another value? If justice and mercy are 
incommensurable because there is no common value they can be aligned in terms of (and 
surely there isn’t), then what is the common value that aligns commensurable values, like 
mercy and forgiveness? With justice and mercy, I’m not even convinced that the weaker 
relation, ‘incompatible,’ holds. Most people would want a legal system to try and 
accommodate both, for instance, treating them as balancing agents, one tempering the 
other, not as hopelessly mismatched concepts.  
In short, values are bigger, messier, things than numbers—and, more crucially, 
stand in bigger, messier relationships to each other than do numbers—so much bigger 
and messier that the differences vitiate the mathematical metaphor, which depends on 
precision to function. 
Looking to the example of philosophy of science offers no comfort to value 
incommensurabilists either, which may be why, they don’t look to philosophy of science 
much at all, except to condemn its version of the concept for extremism.  
Philosophy of science, in fact, doesn’t have one sense of incommensurability. It 
has at least two by most counts, and upwards of five if the pie is cut finely. I’ll use two 
here for simplicity, semantic incommensurability and material incommensurability.15 
Semantic incommensurability concerns misalignments in lexical reference between rival 
theories. It is the prototypical sense of incommensurability that developed directly out of 
the resources of earlier philosophy of science—planet refers to different phenomenal 
objects in the Ptolemaic scheme than in the Copernican scheme; phlogiston in Priestly’s 
chemistry refers to some of the same phenomena that oxygen does in Lavoisier’s, though 
each refers to different phenomena as well, such that there is no isomorphism; and so on. 
Material incommensurability concerns misalignments mostly of standards and practices 
(including argument-adjudicating values, like simplicity and scope), and developed 
mostly out of Kuhn’s attempt to account for the levels of animosity and incomprehension 
that attend many cases of theory succession—differences in reference don’t seem 
sufficient.  
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But the lessons from philosophy of science for incommensurability of values are 
not encouraging. Firstly, the mathematical metaphor doesn’t fare well in that domain 
either, so that I’m not sure incommensurability is a sensible term in philosophy of science 
(which might do better with the simple incompatibility). But, secondly, ignoring that gap 
and going directly to semantic incommensurability, the relevant claim is that reference 
misalignments compromise the comparison of the frameworks that house the referring 
terms. It is not that the concepts are incommensurable. Even in the most restricted version 
of semantic incommensurability, what Kuhn calls local incommensurability, it is a cluster 
of interdependent concepts (and sometimes practices) that drive the incommensurability, 
not individual concepts. So, there is nothing in the philosophy of science use of 
incommensurability that corresponds to concepts like mercy and justice.  
On the other hand (the third hand, if you’re counting), neither is there anything in 
the notion of material incommensurability to warrant application to the realm of values. 
The misalignment of standards and practices again concerns framework 
incommensurability. The closest we can come might be when the relevant standards are 
themselves values. For instance, the migration from a Ptolemaic universe to a Copernican 
one was retarded by a constellation of shared values, the migration effectively only 
coming more than eighty years later, with a reconfiguration of those values. Both 
Ptolemaists and early Copernicans venerated perfection in celestial mechanics, and held 
circular motion to be the most perfect form of motion. Objects in both of their respective 
heavens inscribed perfect circles. Both programmes also valued predictive accuracy very 
highly, but neither had a notable edge on that score. Copernicus offered a few savings in 
elegance, a reduction of the number of epicycles, and a more natural account of 
retrograde motion (one that derived from other features of the model and did not have to 
be simply stipulated). But neither elegance nor derivable accounts were enough to tip the 
geo- to helio-centric balance.  
The predictive-accuracy balance, however, shifted markedly with Kepler. His 
elliptical orbits brought significantly greater mathematical elegance (no more epicycles), 
and, most importantly, his Rudolphine tables demonstrated very impressive gains in 
predictive accuracy. The acceptance of geo-centricity could not be accomplished without 
restructuring the value system: circles, and by implication, perfect motion, could no 
longer be maintained; indeed, celestial perfection overall was seriously compromised (if 
earth was a planet, then all the wandering bodies in the heavens might be made of the 
same mutable, corruptible materials). For astronomers who could not shake their 
allegiance to circular orbits and/or superlunary perfection in favour of greater predictive 
accuracy and/or mathematical elegance, there could be no adoption of Copernicanism. 
What does this tell us about the incommensurability of values? At the immediate 
level of values like justice and mercy, nothing very much. It is the networks of 
adjudicating values that generate this species of incommensurability in philosophy of 
science, not a putative misalignment of individual values. Take, say, perfection and 
accuracy, or circular motion (a type of geometrical simplicity) and mathematical elegance 
(a variety of algebraic simplicity)—none of them is even remotely incompatible with 
each other, and indeed the restructuring could not be accomplished without the ability to 
rank (and re-rank) the relevant values.  What is at issue are not the values, but the value 
schemes. But the story for incommensurability of values isn’t much better at the level of 
value schemes. The incommensurability in philosophy of science, remember, is not 
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between the value schemes themselves, but between the frameworks that the value 
schemes support. Moreover, (1) the frameworks in our example were adequately 
adjudicated (one framework was chosen historically over the other), and (2) values were 
instrumental in that adjudication.  
‘Well, but,’ you might object, ‘the value theorists who deploy the word don’t 
mean incommensurability in that way at all. They mean incomparability. You quoted 
James Griffin on that point yourself.’ True, all true, but in fact that is the final, most 
significant reason we should abandon the slogan “incommensurability of values” 
altogether. It just means ‘really-really-incomparable.’ These folks mean ‘incomparable,’ 
but they want to say it in a tougher way. That’s why incommensurable comes so often 
with a rush of other adjectives and totalizing modifiers. Rashdall denies values are 
“absolutely incommensurable.” Lamprecht claims that values are “woefully 
incompatible” before moving up a notch to “utterly incommensurable.” Stuart collects a 
small clutch of terms from Dewey’s work before bringing out (in a scientistic passive 
phrase) the more precise-sounding and definitive term:  “incompatible, discrepant, 
heterogeneous, opposed … that is to say, the rival ends toward which the individual finds 
himself attracted are found to be incommensurable” (Stuart 1939, 298). Berlin situates his 
concern, when first introducing the term in the introduction to Four essays, in those 
circumstances “where ultimate values are irreconcilable, … incompatible … absolute and 
incommensurable” (Berlin 1969, l [the lower-case letter el, not the number one]). 
Incommensurable, in short, is just a tough and technical sounding word to make a 
fairly clear, not particularly astonishing claim sound portentous. And, frankly, it’s wrong. 
Incommensurability is not a synonym for incomparable in mathematics. As Kuhn 
reminded some of his critics, “on the contrary, incommensurable magnitudes can be 
compared to any required degree of approximation” (Kuhn, 2000, 35). Neither is it a 
synonym for incomparable in science studies. It’s true that many of Feyerabend’s and 
Kuhn’s critics take it pretty much that way, but both of them are on record, repeatedly, as 
saying that incommensurability compromises comparison, but hardly precludes it.16 They 
would be crazy to maintain otherwise, since the theories and frameworks they label 
incommensurable have all been compared, one of them has been chosen by the majority 
of scientists in the relevant field, and the other has been abandoned to historians and 
philosophers.  
 
Rhetoric and incommensurability 
 
And there’s one final problem with using the word technically in the realm of 
values, a problem that is endemic to many strains of ethical discourse, and may even be 
responsible for spawning the whole incommensurability-of-values theme, reification. One 
of the truly relentless problems we have in dealing with qualities (in Western languages, 
at any rate), is the ease with which our nominalizing proclivities can turn them into 
objects. We are alright, I think, so long as we can maintain an awareness of convenient 
fiction about treating, say, the tendency to act in just ways, or to behave mercifully, as a 
thing, so long as we generalize over just or merciful acts to arrive at useful, fictive 
abstractions. But if we start to believe those abstractions are real, independent things, as 
Plato believed them to be, we start a process that takes us away from human action into 
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metaphysics. And if there is any philosophical discipline that needs to be rooted in human 
action, it is ethics.  
Incommensurability, coming originally from geometry and evoking measurement, 
exacerbates this tendency to reify, focusing inevitably on things. The real issues (in 
science as well as in ethics) associated with incommensurability are misunderstandings 
and disagreements, which concern not things directly, but people’s attitudes to things 
(and to each other), and the arguments they build around those attitudes. Berlinian 
liberalism, in particular, wants to drive people’s attitudes away from abstractions. It is a 
philosophy of the particular—of individual, context-embedded decision making. Much of 
his case about the incommensurability of ultimate values is conducted as a prosecution 
against the possibility of utopias. “The very notion of the ideal society,” Berlin says, 
“presupposes the conception of a perfect world in which all the great values in the light of 
which men have lived for so long can be realized together, at least in principle” (Berlin 
1998). Such a world is not only unrealistic, it is logically impossible:  
 
X is ultimate.  
Y is ultimate.  
Not X and Y.  
 
Therefore, there is no possible world in which all ultimate values (X and Y as a subset) 
are fully realized.  
But the fall-out of this argument from abstract values for Berlin is a required 
attitude to bring to the particular case, an attitude chiefly of tolerance.  
The problem is that incommensurability doesn’t get you there. Berlin’s argument, 
of course, is built on a conflict between values, not on incommensurability in any 
relevant way (unless treating incommensurable as a synonym for conflicting is relevant). 
Where incommensurability does get you, if it is taken seriously, is in some arhetorical 
place where discussion is foreclosed. If there is no conceivable common ground (the best 
I can do with ‘common measure’ in this context), there is nothing on which to base 
agreement.  
Take justice and mercy again. Viewing them as incommensurable is a foreclosure. 
Viewing them as conflicting is an invitation. They do conflict, but that fact is unrelated to 
incommensurability; if anything, the conflict makes them commensurable. If they are 
truly opposite in the way Berlin depicts them, then whatever scale we measure one on we 
could equally measure the other on. Antithetical qualities are frequently measured on the 
same metric (heat and cold, light and dark, strong and weak—pick your antonyms, and 
you will find them at either end of the same scale). I certainly don’t want to try and 
develop a Rashdall-style calculus for measuring them. But branding them as 
‘incommensurable’ obscures the possibilities that recognizing them as ‘in conflict’ opens 
up, the possibilities of compromise and negotiation, of value adjudication, of rhetoric.  
Ultimate values do not need to be realized ultimately; that is Descartes’s 
ontological argument all over again. Just because we define God as perfect does not 
require Him to exist, any more than defining a unicorn as a horse with a horn requires it 
to exist. Calling values ultimate does not commit us to wanting them in ultimate 
proportions. In any case, Berlin’s argument shows they can’t be fully realized 
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simultaneously, even if that was our wish. So, what do we do? We try to first 
commensurate them in some rough fashion, to mutually quantify them somehow so that 
we can end up with the right proportions of each in a general methodological way, and 
then try to realize the right proportions of each in particular cases. All this is messy and 
imprecise and subject to complications or breakdowns at all levels. But the other side of 
the coin is worse yet. If the values were truly incommensurable, the only message for 
rhetoric would be ‘why bother?’  
Incommensurability, too, is no friend of pluralism (and I, for the record, am no 
friend of monism). It is true that we don’t get anywhere with Griffin’s ‘mere plurality of 
values,’ but the blockage here is not the absence of incommensurability, but the presence 
of mere. A plurality of values needs to be augmented conceptually, but it is with 
processes of adjudication and reconciliation, not with principles of foreclosure. I think 
this means that the notion of incomparability with respect to values (at least to values 
which share a domain) is compromised as well, but that is an argument for another day.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To sum, incommensurability as a technical characterization of value relations 
fails: it fails as a mathematical metaphor; it fails as an extrapolation from philosophy of 
science, working from either semantic or material conceptions of incommensurability; 
the slogan “incommensurability of values” is misleading, perniciously so. If the word 
“incommensurable” is used in its rough, general sense, there’s no harm. But it cannot 
bear the freight that is required of it as a technical term in ethics. 
Further, deploying it as a technical term suggests an abandonment of ameliorating 
discourse that is noxious. If values come into conflict, as they often do, the task must 
always be to make the choice that best satisfies them—or rather, the people holding 
them—not to abandon choice altogether. Even more troublesome situations arise when 
different rhetors espouse values in conflict with each other. They may not get along, and 
they may refuse to explore their options rhetorically any further, to the point where they 
fall to hostility, violence, terrorism. But, if so, the blame belongs to the rhetors—or, since 
they have abnegated rhetoric, it may be more proper to call them anti-rhetors—it does not 
belong to their values, or to some irremediable, brick-wall relation between their values. 
Calling the values incommensurable absolves them of negotiation. That’s a bad place to 
start from, if your goal is peaceful coexistence.  
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 The initial publications are Kuhn, Structure of scientific revolutions (1962, better known 
in the 1970 second edition) and Feyerabend “Explanation” (1962, 1981.1). Both scholars 
continued to investigate the notion for the remainder of their careers. Feyerabend’s 
Against Method (1975) is perhaps his best known book, and it develops 
incommensurability very thoroughly.  
 
2 As does the use of its antonym, commensurable, and the related terms, commensurate 
and incommensurate. I am just relying on the Oxford English Dictionary here (OED2), 
not on any philology of my own—which even records incommensuration as a synonym 
with incommensurable, but there is only one (17th century) citation for that; and much 
more widely commensuration, which has a small range of senses all related to 
measurement and proportion (Finnis 1997 deploys this term in the incommensurability of 
values literature). On this kind of data, too, I confess, one can’t rule out the pre-Kuhn-n-
Feyerabend non-mathematical use of incommensurability, even from some of the 
citations given (a few of which might be easily take a non-mathematical reading), but I’ll 
just bow to the OED2 editors and compilers, who list all the citations under a single 
definition. 
 
3 Actually dating this slogan, however, is another matter. The earliest use I have found of 
it suggests it was in at least moderate currency sometime before. C. K. Grant, in the 
1950s, gives passing mention to “a problem which used to be called ‘the 
incommensurability of values’” (Grant 1956, 407). Lamprecht does not use the phrase.  
 
4 See Dewey (1932, 124): “belief … always involves valuation, preferential attachment to 
special types of objects and courses of action. . . . The chief rôle of philosophy is to bring 
to consciousness, in an intellectualized form, or in the form of problems, the most 
important shocks and inherent troubles of complex and changing societies, since these 
have to do with conflicts of value."  
 
5 Henry Waldgrave Stuart (1870–1951; Ph.D. Chicago 1900; Stanford University), was a 
president of the American philosophical association, and there is a chair in philosophy at 
Stanford named after him. Sterling Power Lamprecht (1890-; Ph.D. Columbia; Amherst, 
1928-1956); there is a graduate fellowship in his honor at Amherst. Both Stuart and 
Lamprecht gave Howison lectures at Berkeley, two years apart (Stuart in ’36, Lamprecht 
in ’38).  
 
6 Someone who does try to figure out who else might have thought of the value-
incommensurability/pluralism blend that Berlin advocates is his literary executor, Henry 
Hardy, who catalogues a wide number of scholars he identifies as sources of “pluralism 
before/independently of Isaiah Berlin,” including Lamprecht, Stuart, Dewey, and James. 
Most entries in the list are without comment, and there is no general discussion of 
American pluralism, but Hardy phrases the relations between Lamprecht’s and Berlin’s 
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positions in these terms: “[Lamprecht’s formulation] is a remarkably precise anticipation 
of Berlin’s ideas, unless of course Berlin drew on it (unawares?) himself” (Hardy 2001).  
 
7 The essays themselves were written in the period 1948-1959, but the extensive and 
influential introduction, which centralizes the relationship between incommensurable 
values and ethical pluralism, was written for the 1969 collection.  
 
8 Feyerabend’s Against Method (1978) went through three editions, achieving substantial 
notoriety. Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970) also went through three 
editions, making it onto the list of the one hundred most influential books since the 
Second World War by The Times Literary Supplement [1995]. It has sold well over a 
million copies. Feyerabend’s book and Kuhn’s book have been, respectively, translated 
into nineteen and twenty-five languages. It is in any case noteworthy, I think, that this 
strain of discourse is not known, for instance, under the slogan “the irreconcilability of 
values,” or “the incomparability of values,” or “the incompatibility of values.” 
 
9 Indeed, despite the title of her book, Chang attempts to dispose entirely of the word, 
incommensurability, early on, in favour of incomparability, this time far less successfully. 
All of the authors feature the word very prominently in their articles, often in their titles. 
Chang’s move, though, is not a simple substitution. She defines incommensurability as a 
somewhat more precise variant of incomparability. Here is what she says: “Let us 
henceforth reserve the term ‘incommensurable’ for items that cannot be precisely 
measured by some common scale of unites of value and the term ‘incomparable’ for 
items that cannot be compared … I am going to set aside the first idea—
incommensurability—and focus on the second—incomparability” (1997, 2). In fact, she 
then spends most of the introduction trying to dispose of incomparability as well. Her 
introduction is a fine essay on the importance of practical reason for making choices that 
might seem unmakeable, but it is peculiar as an introduction. The use of 
incommensurability in the title looks a bit like a typical bait-and-switch, since she has so 
little interest in it, but all the other essays in the book retain incommensurability. 
Moreover, most of them use that word pretty much the way Chang uses incomparability, 
and many of them use those terms synonymously.  
 
10 What Feyerabend and Kuhn explicitly say on the topic of comparison is (1) that the 
empirical consequences of rival theories cannot be compared, so that the criterion of 
‘factual adequacy’ can’t adjudicate between theories, but (2) that the lack of consequence 
comparison does not mean the theories themselves cannot be compared on any number of 
metrics (particularly values such as simplicity and scope). Kuhn especially devotes much 
ink to showing how they can be compared, and indeed, the sorts of comparative 
predicates that concern value incommensurabilists are exactly the sort that Kuhn says 
new programmes are marketed with: “the new theory is said to be ‘neater,’ ‘more 
suitable,’ or ‘simpler’ than the old” (Kuhn, 1970, 155). 
 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, though, finds the source of intramural value clash in the divergent 
genealogy of values, back to incompatible moral traditions. “It is not surprising that there 
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is no rational way of deciding which type of claim is to be given priority,” among (for 
instance) rights, utility, and justice, he says, “or how one is to be weighed against 
another, [because m]oral incommensurability is … the product of a particular historical 
conjunction' (MacIntyre 1981, 68). 
 
12 The most full-blooded case of an eliminative incommensurability is Joseph Raz’s 
“constitutive incommensurability,” which describes certain non-fungible value 
relationships, where even to contemplate a comparison (or, under a slightly softer 
interpretation, to contemplate acting on such a comparison) negates the superior value. “It 
is impoverishing to compare the value of a marriage with an increase in salary,” for 
instance, says Raz, or “it diminishes one’s potentiality as a human being to put a value on 
one’s friendship in terms of improved living conditions” (Raz 1986). The key feature is 
that the act of comparing constitutes the incommensurability. “We run into ‘constitutive 
incommensurability’ of values whenever treating values as commensurable subverts one 
or both of the values to be entered into the trade-off calculus,” Tetlock et al. observe, “To 
compare is to destroy” (Tetlock et al. 1996, 37). 
 
13 Griffin is an exception here, saying “the monism-pluralism issue is not especially 
central to the issue of incommensurability” (Griffin 1986, 90). 
 
14 In the passage quoted above, Berlin treats these two as synonyms. I think it is possible 
to maintain a distinction between them, as I do below, but nothing much hangs on 
whether they are the same or not; I’m just looking for two value-labels corresponding to 
highly compatible concepts.   
 
15 This two-category scheme is a reconfigured subset of a four-category taxonomy in my 
introduction to the forthcoming Rhetoric and incommensurability (Harris 2004). I won’t 
plot out the taxonomy here, but the variables implicated in Feyerabend’s and Kuhn’s 
incommensurability include misalignments of lexical meaning, evaluative standards, 
experimental methods, analytical methods, and/or perceptions, between and among 
proponents of rival theories.   
 
16 A forthcoming paper by Paul Hoyningen-Huene outlines the positions of both of them 
with respect to incommensurability and theory comparison (Hoyningen-Huene 2004). 
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